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SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF

Surr-An ex parte petition was filed by a minority stockholder of a

foreign corporation requesting the appointment of a special receiver for certain
claims of the corporation against resident fiduciaries. The claims, which had
not been prosecuted by the corporation, were about to be barred by the statute
of limitations. A receiver was appointed and brought suit. The corporation
appeared specially requesting that the order be set aside. Held, motion denied.
A court of equity has inherent power to appoint a receiver for the assets of a
foreign corporation in an ex parte proceeding instituted by a minority stockholder.
Application of Burge, (N.Y. 1952) 118 N.Y.S. (2d) 23.
Where adequate grounds are stated1 and the petitioner has sufficient interest
in the property,2 a court of equity has inherent power to appoint a receiver for
local assets of a foreign corporation.3 A clear distinction is drawn between
appointment of a receiver for the assets and for the corporation with the latter
situation usually resulting in a denial due to the inability of the court to enforce
its decrees.4 Appointment of a receiver is a remedy rather than a right and is
therefore discretionary.11 Lack of an adequate remedy at law is required6 and
since receivership is considered harsh and extreme, courts are reluctant to grant
it unless absolutely necessary.7 As a general rule it must be ancillary to other
relief, but there is some authority for the proposition that receivership may be
an independent remedy. 8 Further, it is required that the appointment be made
1 An exhaustive list appears in 45 AM. ]UR., Receivers §49 et seq. (1943). Typical
grounds are fraud, mismanagement and interference with stockholder's rights.
2 It must be shown that there is a clear legal right, or a lien or that it constitutes a
special fund from which to satisfy his claim. Golden Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Johnstone, 21 N.D. 101, 128 N.W. 691 (1910). Stockholders and creditors have sufficient
interest, Ganzer v. Rosenfeld, 153 Wis. 442, 141 N.W. 121 (1913); Mitchell v. Banco
de Londres y Mexico, 192 App. Div. 720, 183 N.Y.S. 446 (1920), but it may be required
that the creditor carry his claim to judgment, Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 53 S.Ct 142
(1932). Clearly a stockholder may seek this remedy to prevent waste. McHarg v. Commonwealth Finance Corporation, 195 App. Div. 862, 187 N.Y.S. 540 (1921).
3 Application of Burge, 112 N.Y.S. (2d) 906 (1952); Rodgers v. Carson Lake Road
Imp. Dist No. 6, 191 Ark. 112, 85 S.W. (2d) 716 (1935).
4 Mitchell v. Banco de Londres y Mexico, note 2 supra; 8 FLETCHBR, CYc. CoRP.
§5833 (1919).
11 Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., (3d Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 938.
6 Ex parte Goodwyn, 227 Ala. 173, 149 S. 216 (1933). See also Columbia Nat. Sand
Dredging Co. v. Washed Bar Sand Dredging Co., (D.C. Pa. 1905) 136 F. 710, where the
court stated that the mare fact of a remedy at law was insufficient to defeat jurisdiction; it
must be prompt, complete and efficient.
7 Feess v. Mechanics State Bank, 84 Kan. 828, 115 P. 563 (1911); Hawkins v.
Aldridge, 211 Ind. 332, 7 N.E. (2d) 34 (1937).
8 Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., (D.C. Del. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 716; Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, 312 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 595 (1941). But see Woods v.
Consolidated Newspapers, 275 Ky. 479, 122 S.W. (2d) 112 (1938); Yount v. Fagin, (Tex.
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in a cause then pending,9 but in certai1;1 extreme cases appointment may be
made in an ex parte proceeding. 10 The main limitation on appointment is that
the court of the forum may not interfere with the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation. Whether this is based on a policy of non-interference with foreign
created rights or on the theory that the court will not act when its decrees are
unenforceable is not clear;11 but it is clear that courts will refuse to appoint a
receiver where it is found that internal affairs are involved.12 Some exceptions
have been made where all of the interested parties are before the court and
where an enforceable decree can be rendered. 13 Majority or minority stockholders or creditors are competent to petition for appointment provided the
directors have been approached and have refused to act or it has been shown
that such action would be useless.14
In the principal case, the petitioner, a minority stockholder, was a proper
party and internal affairs were not involved. Moreover, the probable loss of
causes of action against certain fiduciaries of the corporation for breach of
their duties was an adequate ground, and a request to the directors was unnecessary due to the fact that the corporation was seeking to have the order of appointment set aside. A remedy at law was unavailable because the corporation was
not subject to service of process and there was an extreme need since the
statute of limitations was about to run on the claims. The case is unique in
that the appointment was made in an ex parte proceeding independent of other
relief. An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions would undoubtedly refuse
to grant this relief on these facts;15 nevertheless, it is a useful and effective means
of preserving local assets of a foreign corporation and of forcing wayward
fiduciaries within the jurisdiction to account.16 Where other remedies are unavailable and where the corporation is not subject to service of process, it would
be ridiculous to require that the receivership be ancillary or to require a preliminary hearing. The corporation is adequately protected in that it may appear
Civ. App. 1922) 244 S.W. 1036; and the principal case where receivers were appointed
independent of other relief.
9 Ex parte Goodwyn, note 6 supra; Laumeier v. Sun-Ray Products Co., 330 Mo. 542,
50 S.W. (2d) 640 (1932); 23 R.C.L. 12 et seq. (1919).
10 Wakenva Coal Co. v. Johnson, 234 Ky. 558, 28 S.W. (2d) 737 (1930); Hawkins
v. Aldridge, note 7 supra; Application of Burge, note 3 supra.
11Appleton v. Wome Plastics Corp., 140 N.J. Eq. 324, 54 A. (2d) 612 (1947);
Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E. (2d) 550 (1944); 18 A.L.R.
1386 et seq. (1922).
12 Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co., 343 Pa. 438, 22 A. (2d) 717 (1941); 18
A.L.R. 1383 (1922).
1s Saltz v. Saltz Bros., (D.C. Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 246, cert. den., Saltz Bros. v. Saltz,
299 U.S. 567, 57 S.Ct. 31 (1936). All the business of the corporation was done in the
District of Columbia and all the parties were before the court. See also Appleton v. Wome
Plastics Corp., note 11 supra; Babcock v. Farwell, 245 lli. 14, 91 N.E. 683 (1910).
14 Application of Burge, note 3 supra.
15 Laumeier v. Sun-Ray Products Co., note 9 supra; Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., note
8 supra; Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, note 8 supra; 23 R.C.L. 11-12
(1919).
16 Ganzer v. Rosenfeld, note 2 supra.
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specially in subsequent proceedings and contest the order. When it is considered that receivership will deprive the corporation of its title or at least of its
dominion over the property, there is an indication that the liberal view of the
New York court should be confined to the most extreme cases, of which the
principal case is a good example. If these requirements are complied with and
the court is competent to render an enforceable decree, there is no apparent
objection to the use of this device and, in fact, it will allow the court of equity
to make good its boast of a remedy for every right.

William A. Bain, Jr., S.Ed.

